








[A]n engineer should use mathematics as a tin-opener is used to open tins of meat.  The mathematician also uses mathematics as a tin-opener, but to open tins of tin-openers.  Sometimes he is content to indicate the bare existence of a symbolic tin-opener without reference to a tin of anything.  He is quite right to do this in the pursuit of pure knowledge; and it is our fault if we do not fully appreciate that his objects frequently differ from ours. (M. Hotine 1946, quoted in Maling 1992 100)

	Most science requires applied mathematics.  This truism underlies the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument: since scientists make indispensable appeal to mathematics in describing phenomena and drawing conclusions about them, thereby predicting and explaining them, one cannot reasonably believe what our scientific theories say yet withhold belief in their mathematical portions.  In particular, in whatever sense one accepts science (e.g., as true, objective, or ontologically committing) one must also accept mathematics; conversely one cannot be a mathematical nominalist or fictionalist without rejecting whole swaths of good science that are seamlessly linked with mathematics.
	There are (at least) two styles of response to the indispensability argument.  One, the tough response, finds its strongest expression in (Field 1980, 1989), accepts the challenge head-on, and attempts to show how to do science without mathematics.  It attempts to show that mathematics is dispensable to empirical science by showing that any standard scientific theory can be rewritten as a nominalistic theory that does not quantify over abstracta and does the same scientific work as the standard theory.  There is some consensus that this response fails because the nominalist apparatus deployed either is not extendible to all of physics or is merely a deft reconstrual equivalent in some sense to standard mathematics.  
Here I shall be concerned with a second, more laid-back, response which denies that indispensability entails realism.  The laid-back response is becoming quite widespread – versions are suggested by Balaguer (1998), Yablo (1998), Melia (2000), Rosen (2001), and Leng (forthcoming) – but I’ll concentrate on a version endorsed by Maddy (2007, forthcoming).​[1]​  The laid-back response proceeds in two steps.  
LB1:	The first step appeals to practice both to sever the linkages between science and mathematical commitment that indispensability considerations rely upon and to undermine confirmation holism, taken to be a central premise in Quine’s version of the indispensability argument.  When experience confirms or disconfirms part of a theory, Quine argued, it confirms or disconfirms all those parts of the theory, including its mathematical parts, that are used to deduce the confirming or disconfirming instance: the justification of our beliefs about sets and numbers is no different from that of our beliefs about molecules and mountains; all are useful theoretical posits that have withstood the test of experience.  Laid-back nominalists respond that holism flies in the face of what we know about practice.  It does not fit mathematical practice: proof, not empirical investigation, is what mathematicians employ when they justify their theories.  Nor does it fit scientific practice: scientists do not believe in all the objects posited by their successful theories or in all the statements they use (e.g., they do not believe that perfectly rigid bodies or incompressible fluids really exist), and they treat mathematical theories on a par with theories about such ideal objects.  Sets and numbers are more akin to perfectly rigid bodies and incompressible fluids than they are to molecules and mountains.  Moreover, to the extent that indispensability considerations (and worries) about abstracta are motivated by naturalistic reasons (and scruples), one should expect considerations about scientific practice to play a central role in our assessment of the pros and cons.  
	LB2:	With the connection between science and mathematical commitment severed, the second step explains how the contribution mathematics makes to science, even if indispensable, does not require commitment to the truth of the mathematics.   We can believe all the nominalistic consequences of our scientific theories without believing the mathematical parts of the theories, in the way, for example, that Van Fraassen proposes that we can believe what a theory tells us about observables without believing what it says about unobservables.  We can accept the mathematics we use to conceptualize, structure, and reason about nominalistic states of affairs, but such acceptance need not commit us to believe the mathematics involved.  In practice, we are accustomed to this belief-acceptance duality: when we model a cannonball as a rigid sphere or as a point-like center of mass, we can believe the predictions we compute, but we need not, and do not, believe that it really is a rigid body or classical mass-point or that such things really exist.  Similarly, we can model nominalistic facts using mathematics and believe the results of our calculations without believing the mathematics used.  
Along these lines Maddy argues that mathematics provides a rich toolkit for the construction of theories and models that both describe physical systems and enable the development and exploitation of complicated reasoning about them.  Scientists “replace physical items [e.g., cannonball trajectories] with mathematical ones [e.g., curves described by differential equations], engage in a sometimes extended stretch of pure mathematics, then draw conclusions for the physical situation based on the assumption that the two are sufficiently similar; in support of that assumption [they] rely on the results of experiment and on evidence that the explicit and potential idealizations involved are both harmless and helpful” (2007 380 parentheses/italics added).  However, all of this descriptive and inferential activity is compatible with what Maddy calls Arealism, the view that mathematical objects don’t exist and pure mathematics isn’t truth-apt.  Rather than being in the business of discovering truths, pure mathematics is a practice with its own internal questions, norms, and goals (including, but no longer requiring, the traditionally valued goal of constructing tools that will have successful scientific applications).  Since, when he applies mathematics, the scientist “simply holds that the world is like the model in some respects, not in others” (forthcoming chap. IV) – i.e., that the world is sufficiently similar to the mathematical models he uses – we don’t need to interpret what he says as committing him to the truth of the mathematics involved in the model in order to interpret him as saying something true about the cannonball trajectory. “[J]ust as one might illuminate a given social situation by comparing it to an imaginary or mythological one, marking the similarities and dissimilarities” (ibid.), the scientist can model the ball’s trajectory by comparing it to his arealist model, marking the similarities and dissimilarities.  Provided the two are sufficiently similar, we can use the mathematics to draw conclusions about the physics.  Nothing extra is added by making truth or existence claims for the mathematical representation. 
The laid-back response is thus a kind of mathematical instrumentalism with respect to science: descriptive and inferential tools, even when we have no other tools, don’t need to be true to be good: we don’t have to believe in the truth of what we say in order to say something true about some target of thought; – to borrow an example from Yablo (1998) we don’t have to believe that Italy wears boots in order to say truly that Crotone is located in the arch of the boot of Italy.  Moreover, this can be so even when we have no more apt way to express the truth, even when the locution is indispensable.  Similarly, when we mathematize a physical problem we treat its physical content as if it were as the mathematics portrays it; we use the mathematics to describe and draw conclusions about the physics; and even if we cannot represent physical facts without mathematical tools, arealism is reasonable.
Let’s return to LB1.  We can take confirmation holism off the table.  Not only does practice not appear to support it, it is a red herring.  Whereas it may be a central prop of Quine’s version of the indispensability argument, content and intelligibility are central to Putnam’s (1975) version.  Putnam argues that, since physical magnitudes (e.g., mass, distance, force) that are related by a physical law (e.g., Newton’s LUG) involve functions from bodies to real numbers, the very content of a physical law presupposes the existence of mathematical objects: “if nothing answers to [the notions of function and real number]”, he asks, “then what at all does the law of gravitation assert?”; and he concludes, “[T]hat law makes no sense at all unless we can explain variables ranging over arbitrary distances (and also forces and masses, of course)” (1975 341, my italics).  It is not that the indispensability of mathematics to science confirms the mathematics used – that warrant may well come from considerations internal to mathematics – it is rather that one cannot even understand scientific theories without a realistic understanding of the mathematical framework that is required to assign content to scientific theories.  We cannot accept the deliverances of empirical science yet deny the truth of the mathematical statements that are presupposed in our understanding of the content of those deliverances.  There is more to Putnam’s insights than meets the eye and more than is appreciated by proponents of the laid-back response.  Considerations of scientific practice do not sever the linkages between mathematics and science in a way that undermines Putnam’s indispensability insights; on the contrary they support them.  Or so I shall argue.
Let’s turn now to LB2.  It rests on two assumptions, an independent existence and a tracking assumption.  According to the independent existence assumption, there exist objective or purely physical facts or contents – I’ll call them nominalistic facts or contents – distinct from our mathematical representations.  Thus Maddy claims, contra Putnam, that we can distinguish the nominalistic content of Newton’s LUG from its mixed or pure mathematical content.  The scientist needs to be committed only to something like: “It’s as if there were real-valued functions mapping objective states of bodies into the reals and the structure of those relationships is sufficiently similar to the structure of the objective states of the bodies”.​[2]​  
One can sympathize with the root idea guiding the independence existence assumption.  The cannonball’s trajectory goes on its merry way subject only to the forces it experiences and independently of our mathematical theorizing, modeling, and calculating.  Science is trying to capture the trajectory and its physical determinants.  Any mathematized scientific theory has a purely nominalistic content, and because that content is independent of our mathematical constructions it would still obtain even if they were arealist products.​[3]​  But while one can sympathize with the distinction, can one articulate an intelligible and defensible nominalist policy based on it?  What is the laid-back nominalist saying when she asserts, “I accept only what science tells me about the nominalistic facts, yet I cannot express that content without mathematics”?  The claim is importantly different from “I accept what ‘Crotone is located in the arch of the boot of Italy’ tells me about Crotone’s location, even though I cannot express that content without committing myself to Italy’s wearing boots” – because, of course, I can express it without any such commitment.  I can point to a map of Italy, or I can paraphrase: Italy is boot-shaped, anything boot-shaped has a part that is arch-shaped, Crotone is located in that part of Italy.  But this is precisely what we cannot do in eschewing the mathematical facts that are presupposed by our science: we cannot point to, paraphrase, or nominalize them away.  If the relative success of mathematical science since the 17th century teaches us anything, it teaches us that we need operations of differentiation and integration to describe and reason about nature effectively and those operations cannot even be defined without appeal to uncountable collections.  In turn, if the perceived failure of Field’s tough nominalist program teaches us anything, no nominalist theory is likely to avoid this appeal without assuming structures (collections of space-time points, for example) that are equally large and thus as mathematically committing as standard mathematics.  
Doubtless, laid-back nominalists will reply that they need be committed only to the claim that when a piece of mathematical theorizing works successfully in scientific application there must be nominalistic facts that it’s tracking, and they need be committed only to the tracked facts whatever they are.  This is the second, tracking assumption mentioned above - successful mathematical representations track in some manner their nominalistic targets, perhaps (as Maddy suggests) because they are similar in some respect to them.  It is a problematic assumption for the nominalist, I shall argue, because our very understanding of tracking and similarity in these contexts is mathematically loaded.
Take any modeling or calculational procedure used with repeated success in a class of applications.  We can think of it as an argument, some of whose premises are mathematical.  We explain the repeated success of this type of reasoning and often base our confidence in the model or procedure by showing that under conditions satisfied by the class of applications the conclusion follows from the premises: if the premises are true the conclusion is true.  For want of a better locution I call these reliability explanations (Liston 1993a, b).  The nominalist must reject such explanations.  If he holds that the mathematical premises are non-truth-apt, the explanation makes no sense, because follows from makes no sense.  If he is a fictionalist and holds that the mathematical premises are false, then, though the explanation makes sense, it can never be used to explain any particular success, because a particular success will be explained only if the premises are true: valid reasoning cannot be expected to explain successful behavior unless one gets the premises right. 
Balaguer (1998 201-2) suggests a way out for the nominalist: corresponding to the standard mixed mathematical inference there is a purely nominalistic inference which we may not be able to express without mathematics but which is sound if the standard inference is sound.  But it seems implausible to insist that the nominalistic contents of the premises must be inferentially related to the nominalistic content of the conclusion as the standard premises are related to the standard conclusion. When we use a shooting method to solve an applied boundary value problem – a beam moving into an equilibrium state under an applied load, for example – the inference tracks a causal process, the beam moving into an equilibrium state, by means of a sequence of iterations that feed back estimates of end states that overshoot or undershoot their mark until we arrive at the correct end state.  We do not think of the looping iterative sequence of calculation our method follows as tracking in any literal sense the natural process of the beam moving into its equilibrium state.  The only reason we have to think that the putative nominalistic inference is sound is either that the standard reasoning is successful, which is what we set out to explain in the first place, or the standard reasoning is sound, which is what the nominalist cannot countenance. 
Maddy argues that the standard inferences are non-committal with respect to the mathematics because the conclusions drawn rely only on the assumption that the mathematical representation is a good model – i.e., that the mathematical representation is sufficiently similar to the physical situation being modeled – and that assumption is typically justified on the basis of experiment and evidence that the mathematical idealizations are harmless and useful.  Good models are those that have been repeatedly tried and tested and have proved their worth in handling certain types of physical situations. 
No doubt this is correct.  But we need a distinction here: ‘has been tried and tested’ falls short of ‘is reliable’.  I recently heard an amusing story of a cooper who cut the hoops for his barrels using the rule: cut the band a bit longer than 3 times the diameter.  His success rate was sufficiently good to think of his method as a tried and tested method – at least he didn’t get fired.  But of course the method was hardly reliable – on occasion his three-and-a-bit would be less than π and the hoop would be too short – and his employer would have been well advised to give him a rule that more closely matched mathematical reality.  
Surely we value tried and tested methods and models, ones that have enjoyed repeated successes and can be expected (we hope) to continue to be successful.  We can know that a method or model is good on the basis of its repeated successes with only a black-box or dim understanding of its workings.  Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries mathematicians made extensive use of infinite series to apply calculus to trigonometric, logarithmic, and exponential functions that cropped up in their modeling equations.  These manipulations were justified by their successes (their calculational effectiveness in providing numerical approximations), by inductive reasons (adding the first few terms of a series often produced a reasonable approximation of the function), and by as if reasons (it’s as if the ordinary operations were applied finitely but without end).  But there was no clear understanding of why they worked, of their limitations, or of how to separate reliable from unreliable series manipulations.  Nevertheless, given their repeated patterns of success, there was every reason to expect a theoretical account of their contribution to sound reasoning, which would explain why they were useful and determine their sphere of reliable operation in a principled fashion.  This sort of account emerged in the 19th century with a better understanding of limits and convergence supplied by Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dirichlet, and others and later with a better understanding of asymptotic series, generalized notions of summability, and their relation to divergent series.  The point is that, though we value tried and tested techniques, we value even more methods and models whose workings we understand, not only for purely theoretical reasons – we simply want to know how things (including quite abstract things) work – but also for practical reasons.  Part of what we understand when we understand how mathematical instruments work is the conditions under which they work, their limitations, how they stack up relative to other methods and models, and this kind of information better prepares us for engineering and other applied encounters with nature.  
	The kind of understanding provided by these reliability explanations is often permeated with mathematics.  Just as our cooper should use a rule that conforms to mathematics’ requirements, so our engineers should use rules that connect with their real-world applications subject to mathematical constraints.  Our confidence that satellite launches will end in desired orbits, that buildings and bridges will not collapse under foreseeable stresses and shears, or that armoured steel will resist expected pummelling depends on the soundness of our calculations and the reliability of our mathematical models.  The point here is not that empirical testing isn’t required: computer simulations of satellites use models of the best empirical data NASA can lay its hands on; steel girders are subjected to a regimen of severe loading and relaxation to test their strength and flexibility and to electron microscopy to check the crystalline grain of the material.  Nor is the point that every successful application requires mathematical understanding of the models and methods used.  This would be too stringent a requirement since often we have to push ahead with only a black box or a dim understanding of the science or the mathematics as ancient mariners did using rough navigational rules of thumb without any knowledge of differential geometry or spherical projections onto a flat plane.  The point is rather that we value the understanding a mathematical investigation of our models and methods provides and the increased confidence in application that attends such understanding.  
No instrument, including mathematical instruments, is likely to get it right all the time and we get valuable information when we understand the conditions under which an instrument will reliably work.  To establish the soundness of a mathematical instrument requires us to establish (a) the conditions required for the sound operation of the instrument and (b), in a particular application, that the problem falls within that set of conditions.  Establishing (b) involves the kind of experimental testing mentioned above.  Even at this point, mathematics plays a role: when we subject our steel girders to stress tests, we do not do it blindly; we want to get certain kinds of information from our experiments – we want to know their stress-strain relations and in particular their yield point (at which irreversible deformation sets in) and rupture point, and when we use electron microscopy to check the crystalline structure of the steel, we want to know that the material doesn’t contain significant defects like dislocations (breaks in the lattice structure of the atoms that adjacent planes bend around so that stresses compress the atoms on one side and pull them apart on the other with a resulting tendency to fracture the lattice).  Our experimentation is guided by the mathematics of stress and strain and even by surprising detours into topology because dislocations are solitons, topological features that move about with constant velocity and maintain their identity stably over time; they are abstract, mathematical features with characteristic behavioral patterns that are instantiated by systems as diverse as crystalline structures and water waves.  
Establishing (a) typically requires finding the conditions under which a conclusion arrived at using the mathematical instrument will be correct if the input data are correct.  Here we should distinguish methods from models, which I have conflated until now under the heading “mathematical instruments”.  When it comes to certifying the reliability of computational or calculational methods, applied mathematicians often have the generic form of an exact solution in mind, which the method, if it’s good, approximates.  For example, if the solution to some initial value problem is a twice-differentiable continuous function which resists extraction, they may try various numerical techniques – the Euler method and the Runge-Kutta method, for example – to approximate the solution.  There is a whole theory of these techniques and how to compare them for accuracy and speed of approximation. Typical results of this theory include: Euler’s method works only if the target function satisfies a Lipschitz condition; the Runge-Kutta method is more accurate than the Euler method; and, for step size h, if the local formula error is proportional to hp then the accumulated error is proportional to hp-1.  We find mathematical considerations being used to certify that applied mathematical methods don’t stray too far from their targets.  
When it comes to understanding the reliability of a mathematical model, mathematical considerations again play a centrally important role.  Suppose one wants to make a map of Earth or some largish portion of it.  Earth is a spheroid, but most mapping treats it as a sphere; it’s topologically impossible to cover a spherical surface with a flat surface map without tearing or crumbling. So we know on the basis of topology that there are going to be limitations, yet reliable maps do get constructed.  The reliability of these modeling moves depends on the mathematical fact that we can associate a grid on the spheroid with a corresponding grid on the sphere and in turn associate a grid on the sphere with a corresponding grid on the plane map.  The details require us to work with infinitesimals: an infinitely small circle on the spherical surface is mapped to an infinitely small ellipse, the ellipse of distortion, whose semi-axes, a and b, correspond (by Tissot’s theorem) to two principal orthogonal directions of the original circle.  Because of the topological differences between the sphere and the plane, however, a scale on the sphere can be preserved only at certain points or along certain lines on the map.  Different scaling systems can be selected so that, for example, at all points on the map either infinitesimal angles are preserved (a = b), or infinitesimal areas are preserved (ab = 1), but preserving one of these provably forces global distortion in the other.  The choice of scaling system will depend on the information we wish to exploit: equal angle maps are more useful for navigational purposes requiring directional constancy; equal area maps are more useful for purposes of representing statistical densities.  
The example shows that good models are sensitive to information in ways that we have no understanding of except through mathematics.  Moreover, the features of a good model are dependent on the objective information it encodes and the information we want to extract from it.  Laid-back nominalists like to point out that treating a cannonball as a rigid sphere whose mass is concentrated at its center is a useful idealization that doesn’t commit practitioners to believe that there are rigid bodies or mass-points.  Maybe models don’t need to be completely true to be good, but good models, models that enjoy repeated success, must have some element of truth to them.  There should be some reason for their reliability.  We explain the reliability of the mass-point modeling of systems such as cannonballs in motion on the basis of mathematical proof: if a spherical body has uniform density and is not subject to frictional resistance and we’re not worried about its rotational motion about its own axis, then its translational motion under impressed forces will be as its center of mass moves.  If these conditions don’t apply, then it may not be adequately treatable as a mass-point.  If for some reason our cannonballs are not uniformly dense, or grooves in the cannon barrel give them a significant spin (so that some of their initial energy is expended in rotation), or we are interested in rotational information, they will have to be treated as rigid bodies subject to Euler’s equations that include the principle of conservation of angular momentum.  
	All of this is as much part of science as prediction and experimentation.  We are used to claims like: special relativity passes asymptotically into Newtonian mechanics as (v/c) 2 approaches 0.  And we take such claims to tell us something not only about the world but also about the sphere of reliability of Newtonian mechanics: it yields reliable answers for applications close to the relativistic limit, but it yields answers that are increasingly wrong as velocities approach c.  These kinds of claims about the limits of reliability of our scientific theories seem to be scientific claims, yet it’s difficult to see how they could be asserted without commitment to the truth of the mathematics used to articulate them.​[4]​  
I do not see how laid-back nominalists can avoid this commitment and, like all good naturalists, respect the methods of science without double-think.  Most of the richly textured understanding of what it is to be a good model is missing in the instrumentalist response.  The instrumentalist response, I argued, cannot rest on proofs by trial and error.  And it doesn’t help very much to argue that model M is good for physical situation P provided M is sufficiently similar to P, because our scientific understanding of both the relata and the similarity relation are themselves mathematically underpinned in most interesting cases.   It is difficult to see how one can be part of the practices sketched here while adding the disclaimer, “But, you know, I don’t believe any of the mathematics I’m using”.  If one is interested only in the tins of meat and views the tin-openers solely as useful instruments for getting at the meat inside, perhaps the tin-openers and how they work doesn’t matter.  But if one is also interested in having reliable tin-openers and understanding how they open tins, one needs to study the tin-openers themselves.​[5]​ 
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^1	  I choose Maddy as target partly because of space considerations but partly also because she directly tackles difficult questions about applications of mathematics in science about which other versions are less forthcoming.  I believe my response to her version generalizes to others’ though I lack space to argue this here.  See, e.g., (Liston 2003-04) for a critique of (Balaguer 1998).  
^2	  Compare this with Balaguer’s claim that, though ‘The temperature of physical system S = 40 C’ appears to express a mixed fact relating S’s purely physical state to a number, all the scientist needs to be committed to is its nominalistic content; science is successful insofar as the physical world “holds up its end of the empirical science bargain” (1998).
^3	  Balaguer bases independence on causal considerations.  Maddy’s argument for the independence distinction is bound up with her project of Second Philosophy.  But her thinking seems to be this: since mathematics isn’t confirmed by the normal empirical methods of science and common sense, we have no grounds to regard its objects as real or its claims as truth-apt, whereas we have empirical grounds for thinking that projectiles subject to Earth’s gravity fall unless hurled with escape velocity.
^4	  Here I am content to argue only that mathematical truth is presupposed in our best scientific practices and leave open the question of ontological commitment.
^5	 . Thanks to Pen Maddy for pushing me on some of these issues and to Mark Wilson for drawing my attention to the many patterns in nature that applied mathematics exploits.
